| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1583.001 | Domains |
| T1583.002 | DNS Server |
| T1583.003 | Virtual Private Server |
| T1583.004 | Server |
| T1583.005 | Botnet |
| T1583.006 | Web Services |
| T1583.007 | Serverless |
| T1583.008 | Malvertising |
Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.
Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.[1]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0007 | APT28 |
APT28 hosted phishing domains on free services for brief periods of time during campaigns.[2] |
| G1044 | APT42 |
APT42 has used anonymized infrastructure and Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) to interact with the victim’s environment.[3][4] |
| C0046 | ArcaneDoor |
ArcaneDoor included the use of dedicated, adversary-controlled virtual private servers for command and control.[5] |
| G0001 | Axiom |
Axiom has used VPS hosting providers in targeting of intended victims.[6] |
| G1043 | BlackByte |
BlackByte staged encryption keys on virtual private servers operated by the adversary.[7] |
| C0032 | C0032 |
During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used Virtual Private Server (VPS) infrastructure.[8] |
| G1012 | CURIUM |
CURIUM created virtual private server instances to facilitate use of malicious domains and other items.[9] |
| G0035 | Dragonfly |
Dragonfly has acquired VPS infrastructure for use in malicious campaigns.[10] |
| G1003 | Ember Bear |
Ember Bear has used virtual private servers (VPSs) to host tools, perform reconnaissance, exploit victim infrastructure, and as a destination for data exfiltration.[11] |
| C0053 | FLORAHOX Activity |
FLORAHOX Activity has used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for the ORB network.[12] |
| G0047 | Gamaredon Group |
Gamaredon Group has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure outside of Russia.[13] |
| G0125 | HAFNIUM |
HAFNIUM has operated from leased virtual private servers (VPS) in the United States.[14] |
| C0050 | J-magic Campaign |
During the J-magic Campaign, threat actors acquired VPS for use in C2.[15] |
| C0035 | KV Botnet Activity |
KV Botnet Activity used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for devices infected with KV Botnet malware.[16] |
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ |
LAPSUS$ has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure.[17] |
| G1036 | Moonstone Sleet |
Moonstone Sleet registered virtual private servers to host payloads for download.[18] |
| G1041 | Sea Turtle |
Sea Turtle created adversary-in-the-middle servers to impersonate legitimate services and enable credential capture.[19] |
| C0052 | SPACEHOP Activity |
SPACEHOP Activity has used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for devices within the ORB network.[12] |
| G1035 | Winter Vivern |
Winter Vivern used adversary-owned and -controlled servers to host web vulnerability scanning applications.[20] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise |
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
|---|---|---|---|
| DS0035 | Internet Scan | Response Content |
Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.[21][22][23] Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |
| Response Metadata |
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. |